Salam's biographies claim that he was opposed to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. This is somewhat strange given that he was the senior Science Advisor to the Pakistan government for at least some of the period between 1972 when the programme was initiated and 1998 when a successful nuclear weapon test was carried out. I look at the evidence for his participation in the programme. 
Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons. It conducted a series of test explosions in May 1998 in the Ras Koh Hills in Chagai, Balochistan and is believed to have had operational nuclear weapons since March 11 1983, when it successfully carried out a cold test 1, 2 of a weapon design. What part, if any, did Salam play in this?
On January 20 1972 immediately after the Indo-Pakistan war which led to the secession of Bangladesh, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the new President, called Pakistan's senior scientists to a conference at Multan 3 and asked them to begin work on a weapon. Munir Khan 4 had told Bhutto back in 1965 that IAEA's inspections of Indian nuclear facilities could only be understood in terms of an Indian weapon programme but Ayub Khan had refused to follow suit. Salam was at Multan. The then Chairman of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission Ishrat Hussain Usmani refused at Multan to have anything to do with nuclear weapons: he asked how could Pakistan make a nuclear weapon when it had no industrial infrastructure. Bhutto immediately replaced him as Chairman of PAEC with Munir Khan who was told to report directly to Bhutto.
When Salam was first appointed by Ayub Khan as Presidential Science Advisor, he and Usmani had worked closely together to establish civil nuclear power in Pakistan and had set up the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) at Nilore, near Islamabad, whose first reactor went critical in 1965. They had also collaborated on a scholarship scheme which sent Pakistani nuclear students to western countries to study advanced topics. So Salam found himself at the Multan meeting with two close associates, one of whom was totally opposed to Pakistan using its scarce resources on a weapon programme while Munir Khan, who had been a friend of Salam since the 1940s, was leading the programme. In both accounts, Hafeez Qureshi, the head of the Radiation and Isotope Applications division of PINSTEC was summoned by Munir Khan in March 1974 and told that 'he had been picked up to start work on a project of national importance'. His office would be located at Wah near Rawalpindi, a site chosen since 'you would need a lot of explosives': Wah was where the Pakistan Ordnance Factories was based. Salam was present at the meeting, as was Riazuddin, then a senior official in the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. The work at Wah came to be known as the work of 'the Wah Group' and 'started by carrying out research and development of the explosive for use in the nuclear device'. Qureshi went on to head the teams who carried out cold tests between 1983 and 1990. He was interviewed by Shahid-ur-Rehman.
The counterpart to Qureshi's explosives group was the Theoretical Group under Riazuddin, described by Shahid-ur-Rehman as 'Pakistan's greatest living scientist' [this is after Salam's death] who 'prepared the first design of a bomb'.
Shahid-ur-Rehman interviewed Riazuddin several times and while he got somewhat confused about the technical terms used, tells a consistent story. He reports that a few months after Multan, Salam visited Pakistan for a meeting with Bhutto and Munir Khan. Then in October 1972 Salam summoned Riazuddin and Masud Ahmad, who were both working at ICTP, to his office--at the time Riazuddin was a Senior Associate and Masud was a Fellow-where he 'informed them about the Pakistan government's political decision to start working for the nuclear option'. In particular 'in the tradition of the Manhattan Project, a Theoretical Group would be set up to carry out R and D for the bomb project and Dr Riazuddin would head it.' On his return to Pakistan Riazuddin met Munir Khan for a briefing 'and plunged into the R and D of designing the bomb while continuing in his position at the Quid-e-Azam University…Masud was directed by Dr Salam to return to Pakistan and join PAEC. He returned, loaded with books on the Manhattan Project provided by Dr Salam and was posted at PINSTECH.' Shahid-ur-Rehman asked Riazuddin to specify the work of the Theoretical Group. Riazuddin replied 'We were the designers of the bomb, like the tailor who tells you how much of the material is required to stitch a suit. We had to identify the fissile material; whether to use plutonium or enriched uranium; which method of detonation; which explosive; what type of tamper and [explosive] lens to use; how material will be compressed; how shock waves will be created; what would be the yield". "The work of the theoretician is to achieve the maximum yield with the minimum critical mass; to identify the scarce materials [needed] . For example, the critical mass can be greatly reduced by using beryllium as a tamper since it is a very good neutron reflector…..However, beryllium reflectors are difficult to make because it is very brittle and toxic and difficult to handle. Thus the first design prepared by Theoretical Group used U-238 as reflector".
According to Riazuddin an early decision was taken to use implosion to detonate the weapon, rather than using the simpler gun method which was less economical in fissile material. The decision was taken in December 1973 when Salam took a copy of the New Yorker article 'The Curve of Binding Energy' 20 with him to Pakistan. The article was based on interviews with the Los Alamos weapon designer Ted Taylor: in it Taylor discusses the merits of different fissile materials and modes of detonation.
So it seems that Riazuddin was the principal designer of the implosion mechanism for the Pakistani weapon. Riazuddin had spent his whole career working with Salam: first at Punjab University as an undergraduate; then he obtained an M.Sc. in Applied Mathematics at the Punjab University and a Ph. D. in Theoretical Physics from Cambridge, both under Salam's supervision, and finally at ICTP. Both Riazuddin and Munir Khan spoke at Salam's memorial meeting at ICTP after his death. It is not likely that such close colleagues and friends would disagree about such a fundamental issue as the weapon programme without affecting their friendship.
Salam did break with Bhutto in September 1974 when a law was passed declaring that Ahmadis were not Moslems. In response Salam resigned most of his governmental posts. But from the weapon programme's inception in January 1972 until at least September 1974 and possibly beyond 21 it seems that he not only accepted its logic that Pakistan's nuclear weapons were necessary given that India had overwhelming conventional capability but actively helped to achieve the programme's goal. Given Salam's use of ICTP's resources to further his prospects of a Nobel Prize, this raises the question of whether Salam, Riazuddin and Masud Ahmad, and possibly others, were using ICTP resources to develop Pakistani nuclear weapons. If this were the case, it would have been in violation of IAEA's fundamental objective 22 that "It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose". The IAEA's main function 23 is "To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world".
The question of whether ICTP's resources could be used for nuclear weapon purposes was raised by Steve Coll in the Washington Post on December 24 1992 24 . He asked "whether some of these Third World government scientists, in addition to peaceful research, are carrying out in Trieste work related to nuclear weapons, missile systems or other military 20 John McPhee, Profiles, "I-THE CURVE OF BINDING ENERGY," The New Yorker, December 3, 1973, p. 54; "II-December 10, 1973, p. 50 III-; December 17, 1973, p. 60 21 technologies? Salam was strangely noncommittal in his reply. He did not try to deny that this was possible. Salam said that his research center follows a "policy of ignoring" whether visiting Third World nuclear and other scientists are working on civilian or military projects. "We have this official policy that work must be done for peaceful purposes, but it's more official than kept up because it's difficult to keep up," Salam said. This is because there is no practical way to distinguish between military or peaceful purposes in the kind of sophisticated nuclear physics and science research that the Trieste center sponsors". This statement seems to me to be dissembling. Compare this with the statement by his successor when the same question was raised:
25 "ICTP does not work, and has never worked, on nuclear technology. ICTP categorically denounces all destructive use of science, nuclear and otherwise, and plays no role in anyone learning anything specific about any weapons programs. All its nuclear-related programs are held in cooperation with IAEA, the world's watchdog agency in charge of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; without exception, these activities are on peaceful applications in agriculture, climate, energy, medicine and water. The decision on what is an allowable program is made within the guidelines of IAEA, and the selection of participants is done by IAEA subject to its rules".
The question which needs answering is not whether ICTP had a programme of nuclear technology for civilian purposes which could also be used for weapon purposes. A screwdriver can be used for military purposes but that does not make it a weapon. The question is whether Salam, Riazuddin and Masud Ahmad used ICTP's resources in support of the Pakistani nuclear weapon programme.
At Los Alamos National Laboratory in the US and at the Commisariat d'Atomique Energie's laboratory at Saclay nuclear weapon programmes and civil nuclear programmes co-exist side by side. But everyone participating in them knows on which he or she is working. Funding is clearly delineated. The record of how Salam won his Nobel Prize does not suggest that he was particularly scrupulous in determining whether a particular activity was undertaken for the benefit of science in developing countries or to advance his own research in elementary particle theory. What about his activities as Science Advisor to Pakistan's Government? A Pakistani physicist who was close to Salam, Riazuddin and their colleagues told me 26 that "pre-1974, Salam was anti-Hindu, anti-India, pro-Pakistan, pro-Bomb. He was present at the 1972 meeting with Bhutto in Multan, then brought together a bunch of good Pakistani physicists and made them into a theoretical task force that looked into various physics issues dealing with the bomb, and used ICTP as a platform for this. I know that Salam never did any Bomb-related calculations, but he did attend meetings of the group and asked questions. Post-1974 he changed fundamentally, gradually becoming critical of defence funding and also of the Bomb. He also felt friendlier towards India. He lost his clout almost entirely by the end of the 1970's".
That's likely to be an accurate picture. It leaves open the extent to which ICTP was used for the Pakistani weapon programme and if it were, who knew.
Salam's main legacy is ICTP and the support it gives and has given to young theoretical physicists from developing countries for fifty years. It seems to me that if ICTP had indeed been used as an adjunct of Pakistan's nuclear programme, it is important to take appropriate steps to ensure that this situation could not recur with any other developing country.
